Spatial ecological public goods, such as forests, grasslands, and fish stocks risk being overexploited by selfish consumers, a phenomenon called "the tragedy of commons". The spatial and ecological dimensions introduce new features absent in non spatioecological contexts, such as consumer mobility, incomplete information availability, and rapid evolution by social learning. It is unclear how these different processes interact to influence the harvesting and dispersal strategies of consumers. To answer these questions, we develop and analyze an individual-based, spatially-structured evolutionary model with explicit resource dynamics. We find that, 1) When harvesting efficiency is low, consumers evolve a sedentary harvesting strategy, with which resources are harvested sustainably, but harvesting rates remain far below their maximum sustainable value. 2) As harvesting efficiency increases, consumers adopt a mobile 'consume-anddisperse' strategy, which is sustainable, equitable, and allows for maximum sustainable yield. 3) Further increase in harvesting efficiency leads to large-scale overexploitation. 4) If costs of dispersal are significant, increased harvesting efficiency also leads to social inequality between frugal sedentary consumers and overexploitative mobile consumers. Whereas overexploitation can occur without social inequality, social inequality always leads to overexploitation. Thus, we identify four conditions, which are characteristic (and as such positive) features of modern societies resulting from technological progress, but also risk promoting social inequality and unsustainable resource use: high harvesting efficiency, moderately low costs of dispersal, high consumer density, and consumers' tendency to rapidly adopt new strategies. We also show that access to global information, which is also a feature of modern societies, may help mitigate these risks.
To account for evolution by social learning, we assume that at rate r I , individuals 71 imitate the strategies (harvesting rate and dispersal radius) of other individuals with 72 greater payoff. The imitation rate defines the evolutionary timescale: consumers are 73 'impatient' if the imitation rate is much larger than the resource growth rate; such 74 consumers tend to imitate even before the consequences of others' strategies on the 75 resource become apparent. To account for information availability, we assume that 76 each individual is more likely to choose an individual to imitate within an 'imitation 77 radius' σ I . A low imitation radius means that consumers are 'myopic' and only imitate 78 their neighbors, whereas a very large or infinite imitation radius means that consumers 79 have 'global information', and can imitate anyone in the population. In this way, we 80 model the essential characteristics of human behavior to make our model realistic, 81 while leaving out other confounding factors to keep our model minimal. When the benefits of harvesting are low, the population is monomorphic (or 'seden- the harvesting rates of sedentary and mobile consumers is small (SI- Fig. 7 ). Since 194 all consumers have high harvesting rates, the resource is overexploited (Fig. 6 ). As a 195 consequence, the cheaters are only marginally better off than cooperators. The cheater 196 strategy becomes more rewarding when consumers are impatient as well as myopic 197 (region III in Fig. 5A ). In this regime, cheaters become extremely overexploitative 198 with very high harvesting rates. However, the proportion of cheaters is low (SI- Fig. 7 ).
199
Therefore this regime is marked by stark social divide, with a handful of cheaters (Fig. 6, SI-Fig. 7) . In other words, this region is most favourable for cheaters. As time progresses, social learning leads to spontaneous emergence of two distinct strategies: a sedentary strategy with a low harvesting rate and zero dispersal, and a mobile strategy with a high harvesting rate and high dispersal. Parameters: b = 0.059, c = 0.68, r I = 0.1. Other parameters are as in Table 1 .
Figure 2:
Increasing consumer density leads to social inequality. When consumer density is low, all consumers harvest at high rates and disperse, because available resources suffice for everyone. As consumer density increases, everyone harvesting at high rates becomes unsustainable, leading to diversification of strategies into prudent sedentary consumers and overexploitative mobile consumers (A-B). Average per capita resource extraction rate (% of total carrying capacity of the system) decreases with density (C). However, the average harvesting rate (white line) is higher than the corresponding yield-maximizing (green line) and profit-maximizing (magenta line) rates, leading to overexploitation of resource and suboptimal per capita resource extraction. Parameters: b = 0.059, c = 0.68, r I = 0.1, σ I → ∞. Other parameters are as in Table 1 . Each consumer is assumed to 'occupy' the space within its exploitation radius, and consumer density is the percentage of total area occupied by all consumers without overlap). Per capita average resource extraction rate as a fraction of the yieldmaximizing rate (A) and the resource left in the environment as a fraction of the carrying capacity (B). The sedentary regime is equitable, but inefficient, because the resource extraction is less than optimal even though there are ample resources in the environment. The mobile regime is both equitable as well as efficient, and the total resource extraction rate reaches its maximum evolved value in this regime. However, for very low dispersal costs, the tragedy of the commons occurs in this regime. The coexistence regime is neither equitable nor efficient. In this regime, the resource extraction rate is suboptimal, and overexploitation by mobile consumers results in the tragedy of the commons. Figure 5 : Four regimes of strategies are observed when varying the spatiotemporal scales of imitation. In region M, characterized by low imitation rates, the population is monomorphic with an efficient, mobile strategy. However, as imitation rate increases, the strategy diversifies, taking the system into the coexistence regime (region S & M). We subdivide the S & M region into three regions. In region I, characterized by global information, both sedentary and mobile consumers have high harvesting rates, resulting in the tragedy of the commons. As the imitation radius decreases (region II), (mobile) cheaters become more exploitative, and (sedentary) cooperators harvest at rates close to the sedentary profit-maximizing rate. With even further decrease in imitation radius (region III), cheaters become extremely overexploitative. For more analysis of regions I-III, see SI- Fig. 7 . Parameters: b = 0.02, c H = 0.8. Other parameters are as in Table 1 . Figure 6 : Impatience and myopia among consumers aggravate social inequality. Average resource extraction rate decreases with increasing imitation rate. In region III, this is because only a small fraction of cheaters exploit resource at a high rate, while cooperators, which form a vast majority of the population, get zero resource. In region I, both cooperators and cheaters harvest aggressively and overexploit the resource. Region II allows a substantial number of cheaters to coexist with cooperators. See SI- Fig. 7 for additional analysis of regions I-III.
